Acta Analytica 30 (4):389-408 (2015)

Authors
Coos Engelsma
University of Groningen
Abstract
This paper evaluates Peter Klein’s objection to foundationalism. According to Klein, foundationalism fails because it allows arbitrariness “at the base.” I first explain that this objection can be interpreted in two ways: either as targeting dialectical foundationalism or as targeting epistemic foundationalism. I then clarify Klein’s concept of arbitrariness. An assertion or belief is assumed to be arbitrary if and only if it lacks a reason that is “objectively and subjectively available.” Drawing on this notion, I evaluate Klein’s objection. I first argue that his objection construed as targeting dialectical foundationalism fails, since nothing prevents dialectical foundationalism from ruling out arbitrary assertions. I then argue that the objection seen as targeting epistemic foundationalism cannot be disqualified in the way some foundationalists believe. However, I show that also the objection so construed does not succeed, since epistemic foundationalism need not countenance arbitrary beliefs
Keywords Peter Klein  Foundationalism  Arbitrariness  Regress problem  Reasons  Availability
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s)
DOI 10.1007/s12136-015-0257-9
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

The Skeptic and the Dogmatist.James Pryor - 2000 - Noûs 34 (4):517–549.
Making It Explicit.Isaac Levi & Robert B. Brandom - 1996 - Journal of Philosophy 93 (3):145.

View all 40 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

On Peter Klein's Concept of Arbitrariness.Coos Engelsma - 2014 - Metaphilosophy 45 (2):192-200.
Foundationalism and Arbitrariness.Daniel Howard-Snyder - 2005 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (1):18–24.
Is Klein an Infinitist About Doxastic Justification?Michael Bergmann - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 134 (1):19 - 24.
On the Regress Argument for Infinitism.John Turri - 2009 - Synthese 166 (1):157 - 163.
What’s Not Wrong with Foundationalism.Michael Bergmann - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):161–165.
Memory Foundationalism and the Problem of Unforgotten Carelessness.Robert Schroer - 2008 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (1):74–85.
Arbitrary Foundations?Michael Huemer - 2003 - Philosophical Forum 34 (2):141–152.
The Confusion Over Foundationalism.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 1986 - Philosophia 16 (3-4):345-354.
Foundationalism for Modest Infinitists.John Turri - 2010 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (2):275-283.
Internalist Foundationalism and the Problem of the Epistemic Regress.José L. Zalabardo - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (1):34 - 58.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2015-05-20

Total views
341 ( #30,324 of 2,507,562 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
10 ( #73,796 of 2,507,562 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes