Dialectica 53 (3-4):211–226 (1999)
I discuss Ruth Marcus' conception of beliefs as dispositional states related to possible states of affaires. While I agree with Marcus that this conception accounts for the necessary distinction between belief and linguistic assent, I argue that the relationship between dispositional beliefs and our assent attitudes is more complex, and should include other mental states, such as acceptances, which, although they contain voluntary elements, are further layers of dispositional doxastic attitudes
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Introduction: Cognitive Attitudes and Values in Science.Daniel J. McKaughan & Kevin C. Elliott - 2015 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 53:57-61.
A Blind-Spot Argument Against Dispositionalist Accounts of Belief.Davide Fassio - 2014 - Acta Analytica 29 (1):71-81.
The Epistemological Virtues of Assumptions: Towards a Coming of Age of Boltzmann and Meinong's Objections to 'the Prejudice in Favour of the Actual'?Nadine de Courtenay - 2010 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (1):41-57.
Individual Beliefs and Collective Beliefs in Sciences and Philosophy: The Plural Subject and the Polyphonic Subject Accounts.Alban Bouvier - 2004 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 34 (3):382.
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