Dispositional belief, assent, and acceptance

Dialectica 53 (3-4):211–226 (1999)
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Abstract

I discuss Ruth Marcus' conception of beliefs as dispositional states related to possible states of affaires. While I agree with Marcus that this conception accounts for the necessary distinction between belief and linguistic assent, I argue that the relationship between dispositional beliefs and our assent attitudes is more complex, and should include other mental states, such as acceptances, which, although they contain voluntary elements, are further layers of dispositional doxastic attitudes

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Pascal Engel
École des hautes études en sciences sociale

Citations of this work

Introduction: Cognitive attitudes and values in science.Daniel J. McKaughan & Kevin C. Elliott - 2015 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 53:57-61.
Degrees of Acceptance.Alexander Dinges - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly (3):578-594.
Trust and the doxastic family.Pascal Engel - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 161 (1):17-26.
John Cook Wilson.Mathieu Marion - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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References found in this work

Truth and probability.Frank Ramsey - 2010 - In Antony Eagle (ed.), Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings. New York: Routledge. pp. 52-94.
Deciding to believe.Bernard Williams - 1973 - In Problems of the Self: Philosophical Papers 1956–1972. Cambridge [Eng.]: Cambridge University Press. pp. 136--51.
Knowing and asserting.Timothy Williamson - 1996 - Philosophical Review 105 (4):489-523.
A puzzle about belief.Saul Aron Kripke - 1979 - In A. Margalit (ed.), Meaning and Use. Reidel. pp. 239--83.

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