Dispositional belief, assent, and acceptance

Dialectica 53 (3-4):211–226 (1999)
Abstract
I discuss Ruth Marcus' conception of beliefs as dispositional states related to possible states of affaires. While I agree with Marcus that this conception accounts for the necessary distinction between belief and linguistic assent, I argue that the relationship between dispositional beliefs and our assent attitudes is more complex, and should include other mental states, such as acceptances, which, although they contain voluntary elements, are further layers of dispositional doxastic attitudes
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DOI 10.1111/j.1746-8361.1999.tb00183.x
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Introduction: Cognitive Attitudes and Values in Science.Daniel J. McKaughan & Kevin C. Elliott - 2015 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 53:57-61.
Trust and the Doxastic Family.Pascal Engel - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 161 (1):17-26.

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