Doxastic Correctness

Authors
Pascal Engel
School of Advanced Studies in the Social Sciences
Abstract
Normative accounts of the correctness of belief have often been misconstrued. The norm of truth for belief is a constitutive norm which regulates our beliefs through ideals of reason. I try to show that this kind of account can meet some of the main objections which have been raised against normativism about belief: that epistemic reasons enjoy no exclusivity, that the norm of truth does not guide, and that normativism cannot account for suspension of judgement.
Keywords agnosticism
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-8349.2013.00226.x
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References found in this work BETA

What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
On What Matters: Two-Volume Set.Derek Parfit - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
Knowing Full Well.Ernest Sosa - 2010 - Princeton University Press.
How Truth Governs Belief.Nishi Shah - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (4):447-482.

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Citations of this work BETA

Engel on Doxastic Correctness.Conor McHugh - 2017 - Synthese 194 (5):1451-1462.
Doxastic Correctness.Ralph Wedgwood - 2013 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 87 (1):217-234.
Rationalization as Performative Pretense.Jason D'Cruz - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (7):980-1000.

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