Epistemic responsibility without epistemic agency

Philosophical Explorations 12 (2):205 – 219 (2009)
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Abstract

This article discusses the arguments against associating epistemic responsibility with the ordinary notion of agency. I examine the various 'Kantian' views which lead to a distinctive conception of epistemic agency and epistemic responsibility. I try to explain why we can be held responsible for our beliefs in the sense of obeying norms which regulate them without being epistemic agents

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Pascal Engel
École des hautes études en sciences sociale

Citations of this work

Taking control of belief.Miriam McCormick - 2011 - Philosophical Explorations 14 (2):169-183.
The Composite Nature of Epistemic Justification.Paul Silva - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (1).
A Defense of Temperate Epistemic Transparency.Eleonora Cresto - 2012 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (6):923-955.
Is epistemic agency possible?Pascal Engel - 2013 - Philosophical Issues 23 (1):158-178.

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References found in this work

What we owe to each other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford: Oxford University Press. Edited by John Henry McDowell.
Freedom of the will and the concept of a person.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):5-20.
What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 2002 - Mind 111 (442):323-354.
The Varieties of Reference.Louise M. Antony - 1987 - Philosophical Review 96 (2):275.

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