Grazer Philosophische Studien 98 (1):1-26 (2021)
| Authors |
|
| Abstract |
This introduction consists of two parts. In the first part, the special issue editors introduce inductive metaphysics from a historical as well as from a systematic point of view and discuss what distinguishes it from other modern approaches to metaphysics. In the second part, they give a brief summary of the individual articles in this special issue.
|
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) |
| Categories |
No categories specified (categorize this paper) |
| DOI | 10.1163/18756735-00000129 |
| Options |
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Request removal from index
|
Download options
PhilArchive copy
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy Papers currently archived: 63,219
External links
(no proxy) Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
- Sign in / register and customize your OpenURL resolver..
- Configure custom resolver
References found in this work BETA
Every Thing Must Go: Metaphysics Naturalized.James Ladyman & Don Ross - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
Critique of Pure Reason.Immanuel Kant - 1991 - In Elizabeth Schmidt Radcliffe, Richard McCarty, Fritz Allhoff & Anand Vaidya (eds.), Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Blackwell. pp. 449-451.
View all 40 references / Add more references
Citations of this work BETA
Similar books and articles
Analogical Inference in Gustav Theodor Fechner’s Inductive Metaphysics.Ansgar Seide - 2020 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 98 (1):186-202.
Inductive Social Metaphysics—A Defence of Inference to the Best Explanation in the Metaphysics of Social Reality: Comments on Katherine Hawley.Oliver Scholz - 2018 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 49 (2):199-210.
Bayesian Confirmation Theory: Inductive Logic, or Mere Inductive Framework?Michael Strevens - 2004 - Synthese 141 (3):365 - 379.
Introduction to the Special Issue “Logical Perspectives on Science and Cognition”.Christian J. Feldbacher-Escamilla, Peter Brössel, Alexander Gebharter & Markus Werning - 2020 - Synthese 197 (4):1381-1390.
Methods and Roles of Experience in Christian Wolff’s “Deutsche Metaphysik”.Kristina Engelhard - 2020 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 98 (1):146-166.
Reichenbach's Theory of Probability and Induction.Arthur W. Burks - 1951 - Review of Metaphysics 4 (3):377 - 393.
Probability and Hume's Inductive Scepticism.D. C. Stove - 1973 - Oxford, UK: Oxford, Clarendon Press.
Hypotheses and Inductive Predictions: Including Examples on Crash Data.J. -W. Romeyn - 2004 - Synthese 141 (3):333-364.
Rudolf Carnap and Richard C. Jeffrey. Introduction. Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability, Volume I, Edited by Rudolf Carnap and Richard C. Jeffrey, University of California Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London, 1971, Pp. 1–4. - Rudolf Carnap. Inductive Logic and Rational Decisions. A Modified and Expanded Version of XXXII 104. Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability, Pp. 5–31. - Rudolf Carnap. A Basic System of Inductive Logic, Part I. Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability, Pp. 33–165. - Richard C Jeffrey. Probability Measures and Integrals. Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability, Pp. 167–223. - Jürgen Humburg. The Principle of Instantial Relevance. Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability, Pp. 225–233. - Haim Gaifman. Applications of de Finetti's Theorem to Inductive Logic. Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability, Pp. 235–251. [REVIEW]David Miller - 1975 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 40 (4):581-583.
Hempel's Conception of Inductive Inference in Inductive-Statistical Explanation.Wesley C. Salmon - 1977 - Philosophy of Science 44 (2):179-185.
Analytics
Added to PP index
2021-01-21
Total views
25 ( #436,143 of 2,448,391 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
4 ( #179,926 of 2,448,391 )
2021-01-21
Total views
25 ( #436,143 of 2,448,391 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
4 ( #179,926 of 2,448,391 )
How can I increase my downloads?
Downloads
