Property Reductive Emergent Dualism

Philosophia 43 (1):63-75 (2015)

Authors
Jeff Engelhardt
Dickinson College
Abstract
This paper sketches and motivates a metaphysics of mind that is both substance dualist and, to a large extent, property reductive. Call it “property reductive emergent dualism”. Section “Emergent Dualism” gives the broad outlines of the view. Sections “Problems of Mental Causation” and “Theoretical Virtues” argue that it can claim several advantages over non-reductive physicalist theories of mind. Section “Problems of Mental Causation” considers metaphysical challenges to mental causation in detail. Section “Theoretical Virtues” considers overall theoretical virtues: ontological and ideological economy, unification with physical sciences, the promise of explanatory gain. On these grounds, I propose that the view coupling substance dualism with property reductivism deserves further philosophical attention
Keywords Dualism  Emergence  Property reduction  Non-reductive physicalism  Mental causation
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DOI 10.1007/s11406-014-9573-3
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References found in this work BETA

Physicalism, or Something Near Enough.Jaegwon Kim - 2005 - Princeton University Press.
The Nature of Necessity.Alvin Plantinga - 1974 - Clarendon Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Interactive, Inclusive Substance Dualism.Jeff Engelhardt - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (3):1149-1165.

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