Radical interpretation and the structure of thought

It is often argued that a radical interpretation procedure for the analysis of thought (especially davidson's) is committed to the thesis that thoughts are essentially structured entities, And is therefore false because many structures of thought do not match linguistic or semantic structures. The author attempts to defend davidson's theory of radical interpretation against such criticisms and to show that the interdependence of thought and language presupposed by this theory does not mean a primacy of either one over the other
Keywords Interpretation  Language  Metaphysics  Structure  Thought
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Reprint years 1988
DOI 10.1093/aristotelian/88.1.161
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