Self-ascriptions of Belief and Transparency

Abstract
Among recent theories of the nature of self-knowledge, the rationalistic view, according to which self-knowledge is not a cognitive achievement—perceptual or inferential—has been prominent. Upon this kind of view, however, self-knowledge becomes a bit of a mystery. Although the rationalistic conception is defended in this article, it is argued that it has to be supplemented by an account of the transparency of belief: the question whether to believe that P is settled when one asks oneself whether P
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy of Science   Developmental Psychology   Epistemology   Neurosciences   Cognitive Psychology   Philosophy of Mind
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DOI 10.1007/s13164-010-0044-x
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The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - Hutchinson & Co.
Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford University Press.
Being Known.Christopher Peacocke - 1998 - Oxford University Press.

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