Giving Practical Reasons

Philosophers' Imprint 11 (4) (2011)
Abstract
I am writing a mediocre paper on a topic you are not particularly interested in. You don't have, it seems safe to assume, a (normative) reason to read my draft. I then ask whether you would be willing to have a look and tell me what you think. Suddenly you do have a (normative) reason to read my draft. By my asking, I managed to give you the reason to read the draft. What does such reason-giving consist in? And how is it that we can do it? In this paper, I characterize what I call robust reason giving, the kind present in requests. I distinguish it from epistemic and merely triggering reason-giving, I discuss in detail the phenomenology of robust reason-giving, and I offer an analysis of robust reason-giving in terms of the complex intentions of the reason-giver and of the normative background
Keywords Requests  Reason-giving  Normative Powers
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Citations of this work BETA
Grounding Practical Normativity: Going Hybrid.Ruth Chang - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (1):163-187.
Authority and Reason‐Giving1.David Enoch - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (2):296-332.
The Moral Obligations of Trust.Paul Faulkner - 2014 - Philosophical Explorations 17 (3):332-345.
Requesting Belief.Benjamin McMyler - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (1).

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