How Are Basic Belief-Forming Methods Justified?

Abstract
In this paper, we develop an account of the justification thinkers have for employing certain basic belief-forming methods. The guiding idea is inspired by Reichenbach's work on induction. There are certain projects in which thinkers are rationally required to engage. Thinkers are epistemically justified in employing any belief-forming method such that "if it doesn't work, nothing will" for successfully engaging in such a project. We present a detailed account based on this intuitive thought and address objections to it. We conclude by commenting on the implications that our account may have for other important epistemological issues and debates.
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy  Philosophy of Mind
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ISBN(s) 0031-8205
DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2008.00157.x
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References found in this work BETA
Epistemology and Cognition.Alvin I. Goldman - 1986 - Harvard University Press.
Warrant for Nothing (and Foundations for Free)?Crispin Wright - 2004 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 78 (1):167–212.
Content Preservation.Tyler Burge - 1993 - Philosophical Review 102 (4):457-488.
The Realm of Reason.Christopher Peacocke - 2003 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
How is Moral Disagreement a Problem for Realism?David Enoch - 2009 - Journal of Ethics 13 (1):15-50.
How To Be Conservative: A Partial Defense of Epistemic Conservatism.Paul Silva Jr - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (3):501-514.
What is Good Reasoning?Conor McHugh & Jonathan Way - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (3).
Reverse Engineering Epistemic Evaluations.Sinan Dogramaci - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (3):513-530.
The Reliability Challenge and the Epistemology of Logic.Joshua Schechter - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):437-464.

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