Intending, foreseeing, and the state

Legal Theory 13 (2):69-99 (2007)
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Abstract

For many years, moral philosophers have been debating the conceptual and moral status of the distinction between intending harm and foreseeing harm. In this paper, after surveying some of the objections to the moral significance of this distinction in general, I focus on the special case of state action, arguing that whatever reasons we have to be suspicious about the distinction's moral significance in general, we have very good reasons to believe it lacks intrinsic moral significance when applied to state action. After arguing for this claim, I pursue in a preliminary way some of its implications

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David Enoch
Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Citations of this work

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