Once You Start Using Slippery Slope Arguments, You 're on a Very Slippery Slope'

Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 21 (4):629-647 (2001)
Slippery slope arguments (SSAs) are, so I argue, arguments from consequences which have the following peculiar characteristic: They take advantage of our being less than perfect in making—and acting according to—distinctions. But then, once SSAs are seen for what they are, they can be turned against themselves. Being less than perfect at making the second‐order distinction between distinctions we're good at abiding by and those we're bad at abiding by, we're bound to fail to make the distinction between good and bad SSAs. One can therefore construct an SSA, the conclusion of which is, that we ought not to use SSAs. After characterizing SSAs and constructing the SSA against the use of SSAs, I then explore its implications
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DOI 10.1093/ojls/21.4.629
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Slippery Slope Arguments.Anneli Jefferson - 2014 - Philosophy Compass 9 (10):672-680.
The Empirical Slippery Slope From Voluntary to Non-Voluntary Euthanasia.Penney Lewis - 2007 - Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 35 (1):197-210.

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