Abstract

The interactivist model of representation makes foundational criticisms of assumptions concerning representation that have been standard since the pre-Socratics and presents a positive model that differs from others on offer in several ways. The interactivist model of representation (or re- presenting), consequently, does not fit well within standard categories (though it is closest to the general pragmatist framework), and, consequently, is often miscategorized and misunderstood. A recent paper by Gładziejewski (2016) gives us an opportunity to address some of these issues. Gładziejewski presupposes a model of the nature of representation, in a version derived from Ramsey (2007), that is precisely of the sort that the interactivist model argues does not work and is not, in principle, possible. Gładziejewski argues that the interactivist model does not satisfy the desiderata of this kind of model of representation, not taking into account that the interactivist model argues directly against such models and their desiderata. The central (though not the only) point is that Gładziejewski begs the question concerning the interactivist model by assuming precisely what the interactivist model argues is impossible, then charging interactivism with not satisfying these impossible desiderata. By simply accepting the Ramsey framework for understanding and modeling representation, he ignores the arguments against such frameworks, and thereby renders his own arguments circular.