Axiomatics and individuality: A reply to Williams' "species are individuals"

Philosophy of Science 55 (3):427-434 (1988)

Abstract

In her "Species Are Individuals" (1985), Mary Williams offers informal arguments and a sketched proof which allegedly show that species are individuals with respect to evolutionary theory. In this paper, I suggest that her informal arguments are insufficient for showing that clans are not sets and that species are individuals. I also argue that her sketched proof depends on three questionable assumptions

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Marc Ereshefsky
University of Calgary

References found in this work

Evolution, Population Thinking, and Essentialism.Elliott Sober - 1980 - Philosophy of Science 47 (3):350-383.
The Effect of Essentialism on Taxonomy—Two Thousand Years of Stasis.David L. Hull - 1964 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 15 (60):314-326.
Species and Identity.Laurance J. Splitter - 1988 - Philosophy of Science 55 (3):323-348.
Specious Individuals.Kristin Guyot - 1986 - Philosophica 37.

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Citations of this work

Integration, Individuality and Species Concepts.Lee Michael & Wolsan Mieczyslaw - 2002 - Biology and Philosophy 17 (5):651-660.

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