Bridging the gap between human kinds and biological kinds

Philosophy of Science 71 (5):912-921 (2004)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Many writers claim that human kinds are significantly different from biological and natural kinds. Some suggest that humans kinds are unique because social structures are essential for the etiology of human kinds. Others argue that human cultural evolution is decidedly different from other forms of evolution. In this paper I suggest that the gulf between humans and our biological relatives is not as wide as some argue. There is a taxonomic difference between human and nonhuman organisms, but such factors as social structure and cultural evolution do not distinguish us from many other organisms.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,271

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Why Hacking is wrong about human kinds.Rachel Cooper - 2004 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (1):73-85.
On the functional origins of essentialism.H. Clark Barrett - 2001 - [Journal (Paginated)] (in Press) 2 (1):1-30.
Interactive kinds.Muhammad Ali Khalidi - 2010 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 61 (2):335-360.
Millikan's Historical Kinds.Mohan Matthen - 2013 - In Dan Ryder, Justine Kingsbury & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Millikan and her critics. Malden, MA: Wiley. pp. 135-154.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
140 (#128,506)

6 months
6 (#470,955)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Marc Ereshefsky
University of Calgary

References found in this work

Human nature and the limits of science.John Dupré - 2001 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Essentialism and constructionism about sexual orientation.Edward Stein - 1998 - In David L. Hull & Michael Ruse (eds.), The Philosophy of Biology. Oxford University Press. pp. 427--42.

Add more references