Philosophical Studies 172 (4):969-986 (2015)
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| Abstract |
Richard Boyd’s Homeostatic Property Cluster Theory is becoming the received view of natural kinds in the philosophy of science. However, a problem with HPC Theory is that it neglects many kinds highlighted by scientific classifications while at the same time endorsing kinds rejected by science. In other words, there is a mismatch between HPC kinds and the kinds of science. An adequate account of natural kinds should accurately track the classifications of successful science. We offer an alternative account of natural kinds that better recognizes the diversity of epistemic aims scientists have for constructing classifications. That account introduces the idea of a classificatory program and provides criteria for judging whether a classificatory program identifies natural kinds.
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| Keywords | Natural kinds Classification Homeostatic property clusters Richard Boyd Scientific kinds Classificatory programs |
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| DOI | 10.1007/s11098-014-0301-4 |
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References found in this work BETA
Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge.Imre Lakatos & Alan Musgrave (eds.) - 1970 - Cambridge University Press.
The Disorder of Things: Metaphysical Foundations of the Disunity of Science.John Dupré - 1993 - Harvard University Press.
A Metaphysics for Scientific Realism: Knowing the Unobservable.Anjan Chakravartty - 2007 - Cambridge University Press.
Science as a Process an Evolutionary Account of the Social and Conceptual Development of Science.David L. Hull - 1988 - University of Chicago Press.
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Citations of this work BETA
Letting Go of “Natural Kind”: Toward a Multidimensional Framework of Nonarbitrary Classification.David Ludwig - 2018 - Philosophy of Science 85 (1):31-52.
Overlapping Ontologies and Indigenous Knowledge. From Integration to Ontological Self-Determination.David Ludwig - 2016 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 59:36-45.
View all 58 citations / Add more citations
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