Unifying Agency. Reconsidering Hans Reiner’s Phenomenology of Activity

Husserl Studies 35 (1):1-25 (2019)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In this paper I argue that the almost forgotten early dissertation of the phenomenologist Hans Reiner Freiheit, Wollen und Aktivität. Phänomenologische Untersuchungen in Richtung auf das Problem der Willensfreiheit engages with what I call the unity problem of activity. This problem concerns the question whether there is a structure in virtue of which all instances of human activity—and not only “full-blown” intentional actions—can be unified. After a brief systematic elucidation of this problem, which is closely related to the contemporary “problem of action,” I elaborate and critically discuss two relevant threads running through Reiner’s work. The first view concerns the alleged motivational asymmetry between activity and passivity according to which it is essential only for active experiences to be motivated by an underlying passivity. The second view focuses on Reiner’s phenomenology of the will, especially on his notions of “ego-centrality” and “inner will” the latter being introduced in analogy to Brentano’s notion of “inner consciousness.” These two notions are supposed to unify all manifestations of the human will, including “full-blown” intentional actions and non-intentional doings such as laughter. Reiner’s extension of will-based actions to non-intentional activity is one of the most remarkable aspects of his early work. Finally, I show that Reiner ultimately answers the unity problem in the negative because he ends up with the view that besides will-based agency he also acknowledges so-called “motor activity” which is not intrinsically related to the will. I close with a couple of tentative proposals how volitional and motor actions might be unified nonetheless.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 90,616

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

The concept of unified agency in Nietzsche, Plato, and Schiller.Paul Katsafanas - 2011 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 49 (1):87-113.
Freiheit, Wollen und Aktivität.Hans Reiner - 1928 - Annalen der Philosophie Und Philosophischen Kritik 7:41-42.
An Outline of the Origin of Humankind.Li Zehou - 1999 - Contemporary Chinese Thought 31 (2):20-25.
Collectivity And Circularity.Björn Petersson - 2007 - Journal of Philosophy 104 (3):138-156.
Merleau–ponty on the body.Sean Dorrance Kelly - 2002 - Ratio 15 (4):376–391.
Hegel's social theory of agency : the 'inner-outer' problem.Robert Pippin - 2010 - In Arto Laitinen & Constantine Sandis (eds.), Hegel on Action. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 3-50.
Shared intention and the doxastic single end condition.Olle Blomberg - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (2):351-372.
The Foundations of Agency – and Ethics?Olof Leffler - 2016 - Philosophia 44 (2):547-563.
Die Grundlagen Der Sittlichkeit, by Hans Reiner.Klaus Hartmann - 1977 - Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 8 (1):61-62.

Analytics

Added to PP
2018-11-14

Downloads
15 (#809,217)

6 months
1 (#1,040,386)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

References found in this work

Philosophical Investigations.Ludwig Wittgenstein - 1953 - New York, NY, USA: Wiley-Blackwell. Edited by G. E. M. Anscombe.
Freedom of the will and the concept of a person.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):5-20.
Actions, Reasons, and Causes.Donald Davidson - 1963 - Journal of Philosophy 60 (23):685.
Zettel.Ludwig Wittgenstein - 1967 - Oxford,: Blackwell. Edited by G. E. M. Anscombe & G. H. von Wright.

View all 46 references / Add more references