Confirmation, paradox, and logic

Philosophy of Science 56 (4):681-687 (1989)
Abstract
Paul Horwich has formulated a paradox which he believes to be even more virulent than the related Hempel paradox. I show that Horwich's paradox, as orginally formulated, has a purely logical solution, hence that it has no bearing on the theory of confirmation. On the other hand, it illuminates some undesirable traits of classical predicate logic. A revised formulation of the paradox is then dealt with in a way that implies a modest revision of Nicod's criterion
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1086/289521
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 31,838
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Qualitative Confirmation and the Ravens Paradox.Patrick Maher - 2005 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 83 (1):89-108.
Inductive Logic and the Ravens Paradox.Patrick Maher - 1999 - Philosophy of Science 66 (1):50-70.
Natural Deduction and Curry's Paradox.Susan Rogerson - 2007 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 36 (2):155 - 179.
The Paradox of Confirmation.Branden Fitelson - 2006 - Philosophy Compass 1 (1):95–113.
Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total downloads
13 ( #402,844 of 2,231,716 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #446,071 of 2,231,716 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature