Elaborating Expressivism: Moral judgments, Desires and Motivation
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (2):253-267 (2014)
Abstract
According to expressivism, moral judgments are desire-like states of mind. It is often argued that this view is made implausible because it isn’t consistent with the conceivability of amoralists, i.e., agents who make moral judgments yet lack motivation. In response, expressivists can invoke the distinction between dispositional and occurrent desires. Strandberg (Am Philos Quart 49:81–91, 2012) has recently argued that this distinction does not save expressivism. Indeed, it can be used to argue that expressivism is false. In this paper I argue that expressivism is a much more complex thesis than Strandberg assumes. Once these complexities are acknowledged, Strandberg’s arguments are rendered ineffective and expressivism rendered more plausibleAuthor's Profile
DOI
10.1007/s10677-013-9434-3
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Citations of this work
Motivational internalism and folk intuitions.Gunnar Björnsson, John Eriksson, Caj Strandberg, Ragnar Francén Olinder & Fredrik Björklund - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (5):715-734.
Expressivism, Attitudinal Complexity and Two Senses of Disagreement in Attitude.John Eriksson - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (4):775-794.
Options for Hybrid Expressivism.Caj Strandberg - 2015 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (1):91-111.
Reconsidering the Meta‐ethical Implications of Motivational Internalism and Externalism.Ragnar Francén - 2020 - Theoria 86 (3):359-388.
Moral Judgments, Cognitivism and the Dispositional Nature of Belief: Why Moral Peer Intransigence is Intelligible.John Eriksson & Marco Tiozzo - 2021 - Philosophia 49 (4):1753-1766.
References found in this work
Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative Judgment.Allan Gibbard - 1990 - Harvard University Press.
The Language of Morals. (Reprinted from Corrected Sheets.).Richard Mervyn Hare - 1952 - Oxford, England: Oxford Clarendon Press.