Philosophical Studies 173 (6):1517-1536 (2016)
AbstractIn some cases of disagreement it seems that neither party is at fault or making a mistake. This phenomenon, so-called faultless disagreement, has recently been invoked as a key motivation for relativist treatments of domains prone to such disagreements. The conceivability of faultless disagreement therefore appears incompatible with traditional realists semantics. This paper examines recent attempts to accommodate faultless disagreement without giving up on realism. We argue that the accommodation is unsatisfactory. However, the examination highlights that “faultless” is multiply ambiguous. The more overarching purpose is to examine the consequences of this—more generally, how to think about faultless disagreement
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Citations of this work
Absolutely Tasty: An Examination of Predicates of Personal Taste and Faultless Disagreement.Jeremy Wyatt - 2018 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 61 (3):252-280.
Talking About Appearances: The Roles of Evaluation and Experience in Disagreement.Rachel Etta Rudolph - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (1):197-217.
Expressivism, Attitudinal Complexity and Two Senses of Disagreement in Attitude.John Eriksson - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (4):775-794.
On Wyatt's Absolutist Account of Faultless Disagreement in Matters of Personal Taste.Mihai Hîncu & Dan Zeman - 2021 - Theoria 87 (5):1322-1341.
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Ruling Passions: A Theory of Practical Reasoning.Simon Blackburn - 1998 - Oxford University Press UK.