Cosmos and History 16 (1):560-644 (2020)

Authors
Ekin Erkan
Columbia University
Abstract
Mark Wilson argues that the standard categorizations of "Theory T thinking"— logic-centered conceptions of scientific organization (canonized via logical empiricists in the mid-twentieth century)—dampens the understanding and appreciation of those strategic subtleties working within science. By "Theory T thinking," we mean to describe the simplistic methodology in which mathematical science allegedly supplies ‘processes’ that parallel nature's own in a tidily isomorphic fashion, wherein "Theory T’s" feigned rigor and methodological dogmas advance inadequate discrimination that fails to distinguish between explanatory structures that are architecturally distinct. One of Wilson's main goals is to reverse such premature exclusions and, thus, early on Wilson returns to John Locke's original physical concerns regarding material science and the congeries of descriptive concern insofar as capturing varied phenomena (i.e., cohesion, elasticity, fracture, and the transmission of coherent work) encountered amongst ordinary solids like wood and steel are concerned. Of course, Wilson methodologically updates such a purview by appealing to multiscalar techniques of modern computing, drawing from Robert Batterman's work on the greediness of scales and Jim Woodward's insights on causation.
Keywords Wittgenstein  Hilary Putnam  Mark Wilson  Robert Batterman  Alfred Tarski  Wilfrid Sellars  Robert Brandom  Leibniz  Descartes  Jacques Hadamard
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Computing Machinery and Intelligence.Alan M. Turing - 1950 - Mind 59 (October):433-60.
Two Dogmas of Empiricism.W. V. O. Quine - 2011 - In Robert B. Talisse & Scott F. Aikin (eds.), The Pragmatism Reader: From Peirce Through the Present. Princeton University Press. pp. 202-220.
Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man.Wilfrid S. Sellars - 1962 - In Robert Colodny (ed.), Science, Perception, and Reality. Humanities Press/Ridgeview. pp. 35-78.
The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages.Alfred Tarski - 1936 - In A. Tarski (ed.), Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics. Oxford University Press. pp. 152--278.

View all 9 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

What I’Ve Learned From the Early Moderns.Mark Wilson - 2019 - Synthese 196 (9):3465-3481.
Researching Happiness: Reply to Wilson.Robert E. Lane - 1995 - Critical Review 9 (3):445-446.
Group-Level Cognition.Robert A. Wilson - 2001 - Philosophy of Science 68 (3):S262-S273.
Announcements.[author unknown] - 1977 - Review of Metaphysics 30 (3):564-567.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2020-05-07

Total views
65 ( #148,934 of 2,381,093 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
38 ( #19,582 of 2,381,093 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes