Reductionist Challenges to Explanatory Pluralism: Comment on McCauley

Philosophical Psychology 22 (5):637-646 (2009)
In this comment, I first point out some problems in McCauley's defense of the traditional conception of general analytical levels. Then I present certain reductionist arguments against explanatory pluralism that are not based on the New Wave model of intertheoretic reduction, against which McCauley is arguing. Reductionists that are not committed to this model might not have problems incorporating research on long-term diachronic processes in their analyses. In the last part of the paper, I briefly compare Robert N. McCauley's conception of reduction to some other current accounts, highlighting the differences between them
Keywords Explanatory Pluralism  Reduction  Levels
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DOI 10.1080/09515080903238898
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Physicalism, or Something Near Enough.Jaegwon Kim - 2005 - Princeton University Press.

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