Belief and Meaning. Essays at the Interface

Abstract
This paper recalls the motivation for a normative account of the conceptual content of our beliefs, namely the problem of rule-following. It employs Brandom’s social, inferential semantics as a paradigmatic example of such an account of conceptual content. The conceptual content of our beliefs – and the meaning of the sentences that we use – is normative in the sense that it is determined by social, normative practices. Nevertheless, a description of content and meaning is possible. The paper argues that the purpose of a normative account of conceptual content is a rational reconstruction in the sense of a conceptual analysis.
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