Philosophia Naturalis 48 (1):9-31 (2011)
The paper argues in favour of a causal-functional theory of all properties including the physical ones and a conception of properties as tropes or modes in the sense of particular ways that objects are. It shows how these premises open up a version of functionalism according to which the properties on which the special sciences focus are identical with configurations of physical properties and thereby causally efficacious without there being any threat of eliminativism
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Pains, Pills and Properties - Functionalism and the First-Order/Second-Order Distinction.Raphael van Riel - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (4):543-562.
Pains, Pills and Properties – Functionalism and the First‐Order/Second‐Order Distinction.Raphael Riel - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (4):543-562.
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