Philosophical Explorations 4 (1):46 – 62 (2001)
Heidegger's Being and Time sets out a view of ourselves that shows in positive terms how a reification of ourselves as minded beings can be avoided. Heidegger thereby provides a view of ourselves that fits into one of the main strands of today's philosophy of mind: the intentional vocabulary in which we describe ourselves is indispensable and in principle irreducible to a naturalistic vocabulary. However, as far as ontology is concerned, there is no commitment to the position that being minded is something beyond the physical. In particular, this paper shows how Heidegger's claim that being minded is tied to being-in-the-world links up with (a) externalism and (b) a social theory of intentionality.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment.Robert B. Brandom - 1994 - Harvard University Press.
Word and Object.Willard Van Orman Quine, Patricia Smith Churchland & Dagfinn Føllesdal - 2013 - MIT Press.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Heidegger, Analytic Metaphysics, and the Being of Beings.Matthew Ratcliffe - 2002 - Inquiry 45 (1):35 – 57.
Heidegger's Analytic: Interpretation, Discourse, and Authenticity in Being and Time.Taylor Carman - 2003 - Cambridge University Press.
Recognition Reconsidered: A Re-Reading of Heidegger’s Being and Time §26.Lauren Freeman - 2009 - Philosophy Today 53 (1):85-89.
Heidegger's B-Theoretic Phenomenology.David J. Schenk - 2006 - International Philosophical Quarterly 46 (2):219-233.
On the Verge of Being and Time: Before Heidegger's Dismissal of Bergson.Heath Massey - 2010 - Philosophy Today 54 (2):138-52.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads51 ( #101,262 of 2,158,954 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #132,197 of 2,158,954 )
How can I increase my downloads?