What can Heidegger's being and time tell today's analytic philosophy?

Philosophical Explorations 4 (1):46 – 62 (2001)
Heidegger's Being and Time sets out a view of ourselves that shows in positive terms how a reification of ourselves as minded beings can be avoided. Heidegger thereby provides a view of ourselves that fits into one of the main strands of today's philosophy of mind: the intentional vocabulary in which we describe ourselves is indispensable and in principle irreducible to a naturalistic vocabulary. However, as far as ontology is concerned, there is no commitment to the position that being minded is something beyond the physical. In particular, this paper shows how Heidegger's claim that being minded is tied to being-in-the-world links up with (a) externalism and (b) a social theory of intentionality.
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DOI 10.1080/13869790108523342
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Mind and World.John McDowell - 1994 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

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