The misplaced chapter on bad faith, or reading being and nothingness in reverse

Sartre Studies International 14 (2):1-22 (2008)

Abstract

This essay argues that an adequate account of bad faith cannot be given without taking the second half of Being and Nothingness into consideration. There are two separate but related reasons for this. First, the objectifying gaze of Others provides a necessary condition for the possibility of bad faith. Sartre, however, does not formally introduce analysis of Others until Parts III and IV. Second, upon the introduction of Others, Sartre revises his view of absolute freedom. Sartre's considered view of freedom helps to make sense out of bad faith in a way that does not seem possible were freedom absolute.

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Matthew Eshleman
University of North Carolina at Wilmington

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Citations of this work

Horror, Fear, and the Sartrean Account of Emotions.Andreas Elpidorou - 2016 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 54 (2):209-225.
Emotions in Early Sartre: The Primacy of Frustration.Andreas Elpidorou - 2017 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 41 (1):241-259.
Sartre and the Doctors.Sarah Richmond - 2010 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 18 (4):517-538.

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