Romy Eskens
Stockholm University
In “Other-Sacrificing Options”, Benjamin Lange argues that, when distributing benefits and burdens, we may discount the interests of the people to whom we stand in morally negative relationships relative to the interests of other people. Lange’s case for negative partiality proceeds in two steps. First, he presents a hypothetical example that commonly elicits intuitions favourable to negative partiality. Second, he invokes symmetry considerations to reason from permissible positive partiality towards intimates to permissible negative partiality towards adversaries. In this paper, I argue that neither the intuition elicited by Lange’s example nor the invoked symmetry considerations support a permission for negative partiality. This does not mean that negative partiality is unjustified. It means only that the justification, if there is one, must take a different form. I end by suggesting an alternative justification of negative partiality, one that mirrors gratitude-based justifications of positive partiality rather than justifications based on intimacy.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.26556/jesp.v21i2.1727
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 69,959
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Persons, Character, and Morality.Bernard Williams - 1976 - In James Rachels (ed.), Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers 1973–1980. Cambridge University Press.
Whether and Where to Give.Theron Pummer - 2016 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 44 (1):77-95.
Love as Valuing a Relationship.Niko Kolodny - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (2):135-189.
Relationships and Responsibilities.Samuel Scheffler - 1997 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 26 (3):189-209.

View all 9 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

The Ethics of Partiality.Benjamin Lange - forthcoming - Philosophy Compass:1-23.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Other‐Sacrificing Options.Benjamin Lange - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101 (3):612-629.
Accommodating Options.Seth Lazar - 2019 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (1):233-255.
Probabilistic Induction and Hume’s Problem: Reply to Lange.Samir Okasha - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (212):419–424.
Lange Vs James on Emotion, Passion, and the Arts.Paisley Livingston - 2019 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 85:39-56.
Self-Ownership and Agent-Centered Options.Seth Lazar - 2019 - Social Philosophy and Policy 36 (2):36-50.
A Reply to Mr. Lange.L. W. Colter - 1971 - Mind 80 (317):122 - 123.
Sur la loi de permanence de Galilée.Lange Lange - 1884 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 18:486.
Philosophische Studien.Lange Lange - 1888 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 26:210.
Les éléments de la volonté.Lange Lange - 1891 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 31:558.


Added to PP index

Total views
10 ( #899,187 of 2,504,828 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
10 ( #74,337 of 2,504,828 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes