Acting for normative reasons and the correspondence relation

Philosophical Explorations 24 (2):281-287 (2021)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The possibility of acting for normative reasons calls for explanation, considering that such reasons are facts. Facing this issue, some argue that to act for a normative reason, the normative reason and the reason we act for (i.e. the motivating reason) need to be identical. Others reject the idea that normative reasons are facts in the first place. A conciliatory proposal is that by appealing to dispositions we can simultaneously accept that normative reasons are facts and that we can act for them, without accepting the identity of the normative reasons and the motivating reason. After sketching an example of such a view, I mention an obstacle on its way. This view relies heavily on the correspondence relation, to make the action connected to the normative reason via a descriptive belief. It is argued that this is challenging since the correspondence relation might not be suitable to play the metaphysical role needed.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 86,441

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Précis of Practical Reality. [REVIEW]Jonathan Dancy - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2):423-428.
Normative requirements.John Broome - 1999 - Ratio 12 (4):398–419.
weighing reasons.Garrett Cullity - 2019 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
How reasons are sensitive to available evidence.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2018 - In Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting (eds.), Normativity: Epistemic and Practical. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 90-114.
Acting and Believing Under the Guise of Normative Reasons.Keshav Singh - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (2):409-430.
Norm and law in the theory of action.Ruth Macklin - 1968 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 11 (1-4):400 – 409.
Desires, reasons, and causes. [REVIEW]Stephen Darwall - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2):436–443.
Desires, Reasons, and Causes.Stephen Darwall - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2):436-443.

Analytics

Added to PP
2021-04-06

Downloads
94 (#156,972)

6 months
24 (#88,871)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Seyyed Mohsen Eslami
Tarbiat Modares University

Citations of this work

Correspondence and dispositional relations.Susanne Mantel - 2021 - Philosophical Explorations 24 (2):288-293.

Add more citations

References found in this work

What we owe to each other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Actions, Reasons, and Causes.Donald Davidson - 1963 - Journal of Philosophy 60 (23):685.
What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 2002 - Mind 111 (442):323-354.
Kinds of Reasons: An Essay in the Philosophy of Action.Maria Alvarez - 2010 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Practical Reality.Jonathan Dancy - 2000 - Philosophy 78 (305):414-425.

View all 16 references / Add more references