Philosophical Studies 99 (1):111-128 (2000)

David Estlund
Brown University
Waldron argues that recent treatments of justice have neglected reasonable disagreement about justice itself. So Waldron offers a procedural account of democratic legitimacy, in which contending views of justice can be brought together to arrive at a decision without deciding which one is correct. However, if there is reasonable disagreement about everything, then this includes his preferred account of legitimacy. On the other hand, it is not clear that Waldron is right to count so much disagreement as reasonable. But then Waldron has not undermined the view he opposes in which some prevailing disagreement about justice is held to be unreasonable
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy   Epistemology   Logic   Philosophy of Mind   Philosophy of Religion
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2004
DOI 10.1023/A:1018787611194
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

What is Democratic Reliability? Epistemic Theories of Democracy and the Problem of Reasonable Disagreement.Felix Gerlsbeck - 2018 - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 21 (2):218-241.
Authority, Equality and Democracy.Andrei Marmor - 2005 - Ratio Juris 18 (3):315-345.

View all 7 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles


Added to PP index

Total views
417 ( #21,344 of 2,462,279 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
25 ( #32,960 of 2,462,279 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes