Philosophy of Science 76 (5):676-688 (2009)
I defend a formulation of the Ramsey Test with a condition for accepting negations of conditionals. It is implicit in the assumptions of the triviality theorems of Gärdenfors, Harper, and Lewis; and it allows for a unified proof of those theorems, from weaker assumptions about belief revision. This leads to a proof of McGee’s thesis that iterated conditionals do not obey modus ponens. †To contact the author, please write to: Institute of Philosophy, University of Leuven, Kardinaal Mercierplein 2, B‐3000 Leuven, Belgium; e‐mail: email@example.com.
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References found in this work BETA
Belief Revisions and the Ramsey Test for Conditionals.Peter Gärdenfors - 1986 - Philosophical Review 95 (1):81-93.
Conditional Probabilities and Compounds of Conditionals.Vann McGee - 1989 - Philosophical Review 98 (4):485-541.
The Problem of Counterfactual Conditionals.Nelson Goodman - 1947 - Journal of Philosophy 44 (5):113-128.
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