The problem of noncounterfactual conditionals

Philosophy of Science 76 (5):676-688 (2009)
I defend a formulation of the Ramsey Test with a condition for accepting negations of conditionals. It is implicit in the assumptions of the triviality theorems of Gärdenfors, Harper, and Lewis; and it allows for a unified proof of those theorems, from weaker assumptions about belief revision. This leads to a proof of McGee’s thesis that iterated conditionals do not obey modus ponens. †To contact the author, please write to: Institute of Philosophy, University of Leuven, Kardinaal Mercierplein 2, B‐3000 Leuven, Belgium; e‐mail:
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1086/605798
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 30,807
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Indicative Conditionals.Robert Stalnaker - 1975 - Philosophia 5 (3):269-286.
Conditional Probabilities and Compounds of Conditionals.Vann McGee - 1989 - Philosophical Review 98 (4):485-541.
The Problem of Counterfactual Conditionals.Nelson Goodman - 1947 - Journal of Philosophy 44 (5):113-128.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Added to PP index

Total downloads
80 ( #72,134 of 2,214,511 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
9 ( #46,798 of 2,214,511 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature