Thinking and Reasoning 13 (4):321 – 339 (2007)
In this paper, I show that the question of how dual process theories of reasoning and judgement account for conflict between System 1 (heuristic) and System 2 (analytic) processes needs to be explicated and addressed in future research work. I demonstrate that a simple additive probability model that describes such conflict can be mapped on to three different cognitive models. The pre-emptive conflict resolution model assumes that a decision is made at the outset as to whether a heuristic or analytic process will control the response. The parallel-competitive model assumes that each system operates in parallel to deliver a putative response, resulting sometimes in conflict that then needs to be resolved. Finally, the default-interventionist model involves the cueing of default responses by the heuristic system that may or may not be altered by subsequent intervention of the analytic system. A second, independent issue also emerges from this discussion. The superior performance of higher-ability participants on reasoning tasks may be due to the fact that they engage in more analytic reasoning ( quantity hypothesis ) or alternatively to the fact that the analytic reasoning they apply is more effective ( quality hypothesis ).
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Citations of this work BETA
Conflict Monitoring in Dual Process Theories of Thinking.Wim De Neys & Tamara Glumicic - 2008 - Cognition 106 (3):1248-1299.
The 'Whys' and 'Whens' of Individual Differences in Thinking Biases.Wim De Neys & Jean-François Bonnefon - 2013 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 17 (4):172-178.
Grounded Rationality: Descriptivism in Epistemic Context.Shira Elqayam - 2012 - Synthese 189 (S1):39-49.
Belief Inhibition During Thinking: Not Always Winning but at Least Taking Part.Wim De Neys & Samuel Franssens - 2009 - Cognition 113 (1):45-61.
Philosophical Intuitions , Heuristics , and Metaphors.Eugen Fischer - 2014 - Synthese 191 (3):569-606.
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