The Logic of Conditional Belief

Philosophical Quarterly 70 (281):759-779 (2020)
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Abstract

The logic of indicative conditionals remains the topic of deep and intractable philosophical disagreement. I show that two influential epistemic norms—the Lockean theory of belief and the Ramsey test for conditional belief—are jointly sufficient to ground a powerful new argument for a particular conception of the logic of indicative conditionals. Specifically, the argument demonstrates, contrary to the received historical narrative, that there is a real sense in which Stalnaker’s semantics for the indicative did succeed in capturing the logic of the Ramseyan indicative conditional.

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Benjamin Eva
Duke University

Citations of this work

Four Approaches to Supposition.Benjamin Eva, Ted Shear & Branden Fitelson - 2022 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 8 (26):58-98.

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References found in this work

Counterfactuals.David Lewis - 1973 - Foundations of Language 13 (1):145-151.
Probability and the Logic of Rational Belief.Henry Ely Kyburg - 1961 - Middletown, CT, USA: Middletown, Conn., Wesleyan University Press.
Lockeans Maximize Expected Accuracy.Kevin Dorst - 2019 - Mind 128 (509):175-211.
Counterfactuals.David Lewis - 1973 - Philosophy of Science 42 (3):341-344.

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