What Does it Mean to Be a Bodily Soul?

Philosophia Christi 17 (2):315-330 (2015)
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Abstract
Evangelical scholars have recently offered criticisms of mind-body dualism from the disciplines of theology, philosophy, and neuroscience. We offer several arguments as to why these reasons for abandoning mind-body dualism fail. Additionally, we offer a positive thesis, a dualism that brings together the best aspects of the Cartesian view and the Thomistic view of human persons. The result is a substance dualism that treats the nature of embodiment quite seriously. This view explains why we, as souls, require a resurrected body as well as accounting for the great good of our embodiment in general. A human person is at the same time wholly soul and yet fully bodily.
Keywords Substance Dualism  Philosophy of Mind  Cartesian Dualism  Thomistic Dualism  Ontology of Human Persons  Philosophical Anthropology  Non-Reductive Physicalism  Christian Materialism  Soul
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DOI 10.5840/pc201517228
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Material Beings.Peter van Inwagen - 1990 - Cornell University Press.

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