Bart Streumer
University of Groningen
Daan Evers
University of Groningen
Terence Cuneo and Russ Shafer-Landau have recently proposed a new version of moral nonnaturalism, according to which there are nonnatural moral concepts and truths but no nonnatural moral facts. This view entails that moral error theorists are conceptually deficient. We explain why moral error theorists are not conceptually deficient. We then argue that this explanation reveals what is wrong with Cuneo and Shafer-Landau’s view.
Keywords moral nonnaturalism  moral error theory  conceptual truths
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Reprint years 2016
DOI 10.26556/jesp.v10i1.183
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Why Care About Moral Fixed Points?David Killoren - 2016 - Analytic Philosophy 57 (2):165-173.
Moral Fixed Points and Conceptual Deficiency: Reply to Ingram (2015).Kyriacou Christos - 2017 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 2017 (3):1-9.
Are Moral Error Theorists Intellectually Vicious?Stephen Ingram - 2018 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 13 (1):80-89.

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