Ratio 35 (2):146-150 (2022)

Authors
Daan Evers
University of Groningen
Abstract
Farbod Akhlaghi (2021) argues that noncognitivists and naturalists cannot explain the epistemic possibility of wholesale moral error. This would show that noncognitivism and naturalism are false. I argue that noncognitivists and naturalists have no trouble explaining the epistemic possibility of wholesale moral error and that the requirement to explain this possibility is plausible only on one particular conception of epistemic possibility.
Keywords moral error theory  epistemic possibility  noncognitivism  naturalism
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DOI 10.1111/rati.12329
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References found in this work BETA

Ethical Intuitionism.Michael Huemer - 2005 - Palgrave Macmillan.
Moderate Intuitionism and the Epistemology of Moral Judgment.Robert Audi - 1998 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 1 (1):15-44.

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