In Defence of Proportionalism

European Journal of Philosophy 21 (2):313-320 (2013)
Abstract
In his book Slaves of the Passions, Mark Schroeder defends a Humean theory of reasons. Humeanism is the view that you have a reason to X only if X-ing promotes at least one of your desires. But Schroeder rejects a natural companion theory of the weight of reasons, which he calls proportionalism. According to it, the weight of a reason is proportionate to the strength of the desire that grounds it and the extent to which the act promotes the object of that desire. In this paper, I aim to do three things: (1) to show why Schroeder's arguments against proportionalism do not refute it; (2) to identify the real trouble with proportionalism; and (3) to suggest a better way of understanding it (preferentialism). According to this theory, the overall strength of reasons is determined by the agent's preferences
Keywords Humeanism  reasons  weight of reasons  preferences  Mark Schroeder  hypotheticalism
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DOI 10.1111/ejop.12042
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Slaves of the Passions.Mark Andrew Schroeder - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
Humean Agent-Neutral Reasons?Daan Evers - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (1):55 – 67.

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