Abstract

The aim of this paper is to explore the conditions under which generalisation from single case studies, in the sense of making inferences concerning a wider class of phenomena beyond a case, is reasonable. Two sets of conditions, in particular, provide the basis for our consideration of this issue. The first is an exploration of the impressive amount of empirical knowledge that is contained within the theories that are used to make observations, to classify phenomena, and to understand and interpret cases. The second is recognition of the role of a pattern of inference known as abduction, or inference to the best explanation, in drawing conclusions from case studies. It is argued that these two conditions, when applied to the procedures for conducting case studies, can be used to defend, as reasonable, the making of certain provisional generalisations from single cases. An epistemological procedure for testing and further justifying these generalisations, with a particular emphasis on dealing with the problem of confirmation bias, is then discussed and recommended.