Other voices, other minds

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (2):213-222 (2000)
Solipsism can be refuted along fairly traditional, internalist lines, by means of a second-order induction. We are justified in believing in other minds, because other people tell us that they have minds, and we have good inductive reason to believe that whatever certain others say is likely to be true. This simple argument is sound, the author argues, even though we are in no prior position to believe that other thinking people exist as such, or that the sounds they make have any meaning. The mere phenomenal surfaces of others' statements form sufficient grounds for the induction that the argument requires
Keywords A Priori  Epistemology  Mind  Reality  Solipsism
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DOI 10.1080/00048400012349491
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