Substance Dualism and Disembodied Existence

Faith and Philosophy 17 (3):333-347 (2000)
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In a number of places, Richard Swinburne has defended the logical possibility of perception without a body; and has inferred from this logical possibility that substance dualism is true. I challenge his defence of disembodied perception by arguing that a disembodied perceiver would not be able to distinguish between perceptions and hallucinations. I then claim that even if disembodied perception were possible, this could not be used to support substance dualism: such an inference would be either invalid or question-begging.



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Nicholas Everitt
University of East Anglia

References found in this work

Swinburne's Argument for Dualism.Thomas W. Smythe - 1994 - Faith and Philosophy 11 (1):127-133.

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