Synthese 192 (11):3663-3676 (2015)
Authors |
|
Abstract |
Sharon Street argues that realism about epistemic normativity is false. Realists believe there are truths about epistemic reasons that hold independently of the agent’s attitudes. Street argues by dilemma. Either the realist accepts a certain account of the nature of belief, or she does not. If she does, then she cannot consistently accept realism. If she does not, then she has no scientifically credible explanation of the fact that our epistemic behaviours or beliefs about epistemic reasons align with independent normative truths. I argue that neither horn is very sharp for realists about epistemic normativity
|
Keywords | Sharon street Epistemic normativity Epistemic reasons Evolution Moral realism and antirealism |
Categories | (categorize this paper) |
DOI | 10.1007/s11229-015-0714-4 |
Options |
![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
Download options
References found in this work BETA
A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value.Sharon Street - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 127 (1):109-166.
View all 16 references / Add more references
Citations of this work BETA
A New Reliability Defeater for Evolutionary Naturalism.William J. Talbott - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (3):538-564.
Companions in Guilt Arguments and Moore's Paradox.Michael Campbell - 2017 - Symposion: Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 4 (2):151-173.
Similar books and articles
Analytics
Added to PP index
2015-03-05
Total views
427 ( #22,693 of 2,506,297 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
18 ( #47,658 of 2,506,297 )
2015-03-05
Total views
427 ( #22,693 of 2,506,297 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
18 ( #47,658 of 2,506,297 )
How can I increase my downloads?
Downloads