Old evidence again

Authors
Simon Evnine
University of Miami
Abstract
A critique of Mark Kaplan's attempt to solve the problem of old evidence by restricting the principle of when something is evidence explicitly to cases in which we are less than certain of it.
Keywords Kaplan  Old Evidence  Bayesianism
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