Personhood and future belief: two arguments for something like Reflection

Erkenntnis 67 (1):91-110 (2007)

Authors
Simon Evnine
University of Miami
Abstract
This paper offers two new arguments for a version of Reflection, the principle that says, roughly, that if one knew now what one would believe in the future, one ought to believe it now. The most prominent existing argument for the principle is the coherence-based Dutch Strategy argument advanced by Bas van Fraassen (and others). My two arguments are quite different. The first is a truth-based argument. On the basis of two substantive premises, that people’s beliefs generally get better over time and that being a person requires having knowledge of this fact, it concludes that it is rational to treat your future selves as experts. The second argument is a transcendental one. Being a person requires being able to engage in plans and projects. But these cannot be meaningfully undertaken unless one has Reflection-like expectations about one’s future beliefs. Hence, satisfaction of Reflection is necessary for being a person. Together, the arguments show that satisfaction of Reflection is both rational and necessary for persons.
Keywords van Fraassen  Reflection  Belief
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DOI 10.1007/s10670-007-9044-3
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References found in this work BETA

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford University Press.
Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Center for the Study of Language and Information.
Betting on Theories.Patrick Maher - 2008 - Cambridge University Press.
Belief and the Will.Bas C. van Fraassen - 2010 - In Antony Eagle (ed.), Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings. Routledge. pp. 235-256.

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Citations of this work BETA

Distorted Reflection.Rachael Briggs - 2009 - Philosophical Review 118 (1):59-85.
Probability, Self‐Location, and Quantum Branching.Peter J. Lewis - 2009 - Philosophy of Science 76 (5):1009-1019.

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