Mind 110 (438):335-367 (2001)

Authors
Simon Evnine
University of Miami
Abstract
I argue for the thesis (UL) that there are certain logical abilities that any rational creature must have. Opposition to UL comes from naturalized epistemologists who hold that it is a purely empirical question which logical abilities a rational creature has. I provide arguments that any creatures meeting certain conditions—plausible necessary conditions on rationality—must have certain specific logical concepts and be able to use them in certain specific ways. For example, I argue that any creature able to grasp theories must have a concept of conjunction subject to the usual introduction and elimination rules. I also deal with disjunction, conditionality and negation. Finally, I put UL to work in showing how it could be used to define a notion of logical obviousness that would be well suited to certain contexts—e.g. radical translation and epistemic logic—in which a concept of obviousness is often invoked.
Keywords Logical concepts  Logical abilities  Cherniak  Rationality
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1093/mind/110.438.335
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

References found in this work BETA

An Essay on Free Will.Peter Van Inwagen - 1983 - Oxford University Press.
Philosophy of Logic.W. V. O. Quine - 1970 - Harvard University Press.

View all 38 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Argumentation and Distortion.Jonathan Adler - 2007 - Episteme 4 (3):382-401.
The Indefinability of €œOne”.Laurence Goldstein - 2002 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 31 (1):29-42.
Probability and Tempered Modal Eliminativism.Michael J. Shaffer - 2004 - History and Philosophy of Logic 25 (4):305-318.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Criteria of Rationality and the Problem of Logical Sloth.Andre Kukla - 1991 - Philosophy of Science 58 (3):486-490.
A Rule of Minimal Rationality: The Logical Link Between Beliefs and Values.Jeffrey Foss - 1976 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 19 (1-4):341 – 353.
What is the Normative Role of Logic?Hartry Field - 2009 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 83 (1):251-268.
The Role of Logical Inference in Heuristic Rationality.Leah Savion & Raymundo Morado - 2007 - The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 5:13-18.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
445 ( #15,200 of 2,402,081 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
22 ( #35,417 of 2,402,081 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes