Authors
Nir Eyal
Harvard University
Abstract
This article argues that, in its standard formulation, luck-egalitarianism is false. In particular, I show that disadvantages that result from perfectly free choice can constitute egalitarian injustice. I also propose a modified formulation of luck-egalitarianism that would withstand my criticism. One merit of the modification is that it helps us to reconcile widespread intuitions about distributive justice with equally widespread intuitions about punitive justice.
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Reprint years 2007
DOI 10.26556/jesp.v2i1.19
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References found in this work BETA

What is the Point of Equality?Elizabeth Anderson - 1999 - Ethics 109 (2):287-337.
Luck and Equality.Susan Hurley & Richard J. Arneson - 2001 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes( 75:51-90.

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Citations of this work BETA

Responsibility and the Consequences of Choice.Serena Olsaretti - 2009 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 109 (1pt2):165-188.
Equality of Opportunity.Richard Arneson - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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