Ontología social y derechos humanos en John R. Searle

Análisis Filosófico 31 (2):115-139 (2011)

Abstract
Este artículo se opone a la tesis recientemente sostenida por John Searle según la cual no existen los derechos humanos positivos. Argumentamos que la existencia de dichos derechos no es contradictoria, como pretende Searle, con las nociones de "derecho" y"derechos humanos" definidas en su ontología social. Por consiguiente, es posible aceptar la ontología social de Searle y afirmar al mismo tiempo que los derechos humanos positivos existen. En segundo lugar, ofrecemos razones para cuestionar la supuesta prioridad lógica de una ontología social al modo en que Searle la entiende (esto es, como una empresa puramente analítica) sobre los desarrollos más específicos de la filosofía moral, social y política. Al contrario, sugerimos que, por lo que se refiere a la realidad social, los compromisos ontológicos dependen de los presupuestos sustantivos que se adopten en relación con la naturaleza y los fines de la sociedad misma, o bien no pasarán de ser un formalismo vacío sin relevancia heurística alguna. [This paper challenges the point recently made by John Searle that there are no positive human rights. We contend that the existence of positive human rights is not inconsistent, as Searle argues, with the notions of "right" and "human rights" as defined in his social ontology. Therefore, one could adhere to Searle's social ontology and assert the existence of positive human rights at the same time. Subsequently, the paper gives reason to question the alleged logical priority of social ontology in Searle's sense (i.e., as a purely analytic endeavour) over the particular developments of moral, social, and political philosophy. We suggest, on the contrary, that concerning social reality ontological commitments are dependent on substantive assumptions about the nature and aims of society itself, or else they amount to an empty formalism with no heuristic relevance.]
Keywords Derechos humanos  Ontología social  Searle  Relatividad ontológica  Social ontology  Searle  Ontological relativity  Human rights
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