Is there collective scientific knowledge? Arguments from explanation

Philosophical Quarterly 61 (243):247-269 (2011)
Authors
Melinda Bonnie Fagan
University of Utah
Abstract
If there is collective scientific knowledge, then at least some scientific groups have beliefs over and above the personal beliefs of their members. Gilbert's plural-subjects theory makes precise the notion of ‘over and above’ here. Some philosophers have used plural-subjects theory to argue that philosophical, historical and sociological studies of science should take account of collective beliefs of scientific groups. Their claims rest on the premise that our best explanations of scientific change include these collective beliefs. I argue that Gilbert's account of collective scientific belief does not provide a better explanation of scientific change than a non-collective alternative. A different defence of collective scientific belief and knowledge is needed
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2010.676.x
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 34,515
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Inductive Social Metaphysics—A Defence of Inference to the Best Explanation in the Metaphysics of Social Reality: Comments on Katherine Hawley.Oliver R. Scholz - 2018 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 49 (2):199-210.
Collective Scientific Knowledge.Melinda Fagan - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (12):821-831.

View all 10 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2010-07-15

Total downloads
98 ( #62,696 of 2,268,267 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
4 ( #106,488 of 2,268,267 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature