Manuscrito 43 (2):95-113 (2020)

This paper criticises Kevin Toh’s expressivist reconstruction of H. L. A. Hart’s semantics of legal statements on the grounds that two implications of Toh’s reading are arguably too disruptive to Hart’s theory of law. The first of these implications is that legal statements are rendered indistinguishable from statements of value. The second is that the concept of a rule of recognition is rendered dispensable. I argue for the unacceptability of these consequences from a Hartian standpoint in the first two sections of this paper. The last two sections present an alternative view of Hart’s semantics of legal statements, according to which legal normativity is explained in terms of conformity to patterns of validity that by themselves neither provide objective reasons for action nor entail subjective acceptance of such reasons.
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DOI 10.1590/
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References found in this work BETA

Reason-Giving and the Law.David Enoch - 2011 - In Leslie Green & Brian Leiter (eds.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Law. Oxford University Press.
Il concetto di obbligo.H. L. A. Hart - 1966 - Rivista di Filosofia 57 (2):125-40.

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