Medical Disorder Is Not a Black Box Essentialist Concept

Philosophy of Medicine 4 (1) (2023)
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Abstract

Defining Mental Disorder: Jerome Wakefield and His Critics, edited by Denis Forest and Luc Faucher, is essential reading for students and researchers in philosophy of medicine whose work is informed by that of Jerome Wakefield, or the disease debate in general. If you are anything like me, this book will open the door to a new depth of understanding of the harmful dysfunction analysis (HDA) and its methodical underpinnings, and an enriched appreciation of what is at stake in defining medical disorder. To those confident that they understand Wakefield’s view and the surrounding debate, thinking perhaps that they do not need a refresher, I would say: perhaps you do not understand it as well as you think. Defining Mental Disorder provides much more than an overview of previously well-trodden ground. The chapters themselves, and Wakefield’s own detailed responses, help to elucidate a number of methodological nuances and peculiarities that have rarely been covered in such depth before. I was startled to learn how philosophically complex Wakefield’s position actually is, and how shallow my own understanding of it has been. It emerges as a far more nuanced and sophisticated account than I had given it credit for, and one that deserves serious reevaluation.

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reprint Fagerberg, Harriet (2023) "What we argue about when we argue about disease". Philosophy of Medicine 4(1):1-20

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Harriet Fagerberg
Cambridge University

Citations of this work

Proper Functions are Proximal Functions.Harriet Fagerberg & Justin Garson - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
What we argue about when we argue about disease.Harriet Fagerberg - 2023 - Philosophy of Medicine 4 (1):1-20.

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References found in this work

Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1980 - Critica 17 (49):69-71.
Health as a theoretical concept.Christopher Boorse - 1977 - Philosophy of Science 44 (4):542-573.
In defense of proper functions.Ruth Millikan - 1989 - Philosophy of Science 56 (June):288-302.
Truth and objectivity in conceptual engineering.Sarah Sawyer - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63 (9):1001-1022.

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