Erkenntnis 14 (3):219 - 250 (1979)

Abstract
Causation has traditionally been analyzed either as a relation of nomic dependence or as a relation of counterfactual dependence. I argue for a third program, a physicalistic reduction of the causal relation to one of energy-momentum transference in the technical sense of physics. This physicalistic analysis is argued to have the virtues of easily handling the standard counterexamples to the nomic and counterfactual analyses, offering a plausible epistemology for our knowledge of causes, and elucidating the nature of the relation between causation and physical science.
Keywords Causation
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/BF00174894
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 60,694
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Metaphysical Causation.Alastair Wilson - 2018 - Noûs 52 (4):723-751.
Causation by Disconnection.Jonathan Schaffer - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (2):285-300.
Representing Causation.Phillip Wolff - 2007 - Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 136 (1):82-111.
Overdetermining Causes.Jonathan Schaffer - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 114 (1-2):23 - 45.

View all 121 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

A Dilemma for the Counterfactual Analysis of Causation.S. Barker - 2003 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (1):62 – 77.
Physics and the Direction of Causation.D. Dieks - 1986 - Erkenntnis 25 (1):85 - 110.
Causation and Conditionals.Ernest Sosa (ed.) - 1974 - Oxford University Press.
Indeterminism, Counterfactuals, and Causation.Richard Otte - 1987 - Philosophy of Science 54 (1):45-62.
Causes as Explanations: A Critique.Jaegwon Kim - 1981 - Theory and Decision 13 (4):293.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
166 ( #61,290 of 2,438,566 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
4 ( #167,451 of 2,438,566 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes