Erkenntnis 14 (3):219 - 250 (1979)
Causation has traditionally been analyzed either as a relation of nomic dependence or as a relation of counterfactual dependence. I argue for a third program, a physicalistic reduction of the causal relation to one of energy-momentum transference in the technical sense of physics. This physicalistic analysis is argued to have the virtues of easily handling the standard counterexamples to the nomic and counterfactual analyses, offering a plausible epistemology for our knowledge of causes, and elucidating the nature of the relation between causation and physical science.
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Citations of this work BETA
On the Causal Completeness of Physics.Agustín Vicente - 2006 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 20 (2):149 – 171.
The Supervenience Argument, Overdetermination, and Causal Drainage: Assessing Kim's Master Argument.Sven Walter - 2008 - Philosophical Psychology 21 (5):673 – 696.
The Interventionist Account of Causation and Non-Causal Association Laws.Max Kistler - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (1):1-20.
Causation: Empirical Trends and Future Directions.David Rose & David Danks - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (9):643-653.
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