Social Epistemology 21 (3):267 – 280 (2007)
We all pursue epistemic goals as individuals. But we also pursue collective epistemic goals. In the case of many groups to which we belong, we want each member of the group - and sometimes even the group itself - to have as many true beliefs as possible and as few false beliefs as possible. In this paper, I respond to the main objections to the very idea of such collective epistemic goals. Furthermore, I describe the various ways that our collective epistemic goals can come into conflict with each other. And I argue that we must appeal to pragmatic considerations in order to resolve such conflicts.
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References found in this work BETA
The Advancement of Science: Science Without Legend, Objectivity Without Illusions.Philip Kitcher - 1993 - Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Assertions, Joint Epistemic Actions and Social Practices.Seumas Miller - 2016 - Synthese 193 (1):71-94.
Which Groups Have Scientific Knowledge? Wray Vs. Rolin.Chris Dragos - 2016 - Social Epistemology 30 (5-6):611-623.
Groups as Epistemic Communities: Social Forces and Affect as Antecedents to Knowledge.Miika Vähämaa - 2013 - Social Epistemology 27 (1):3 - 20.
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