Social Epistemology 21 (3):267 – 280 (2007)

Authors
Don Fallis
Northeastern University
Abstract
We all pursue epistemic goals as individuals. But we also pursue collective epistemic goals. In the case of many groups to which we belong, we want each member of the group - and sometimes even the group itself - to have as many true beliefs as possible and as few false beliefs as possible. In this paper, I respond to the main objections to the very idea of such collective epistemic goals. Furthermore, I describe the various ways that our collective epistemic goals can come into conflict with each other. And I argue that we must appeal to pragmatic considerations in order to resolve such conflicts.
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DOI 10.1080/02691720701674106
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References found in this work BETA

Theory of Knowledge.Roderick Milton Chisholm - 1966 - Englewood Cliffs, NJ, USA: Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall.
Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach.Karl Raimund Popper - 1972 - Oxford, England: Oxford, Clarendon Press.
An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding.David Hume - 1955 - In Steven M. Cahn (ed.), Exploring Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology. Oxford University Press. pp. 112.

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Citations of this work BETA

Groups Can Know How.Chris Dragos - 2019 - American Philosophical Quarterly 56 (3):265-276.
Epistemic Autonomy and Group Knowledge.Chris Dragos - 2019 - Synthese 198 (7):6259-6279.
Group Justification in Science.Kristina Rolin - 2010 - Episteme 7 (3):215-231.
Deliberation and Group Disagreement.Fernando Broncano-Berrocal & J. Adam Carter - 2020 - In Fernando Broncano-Berrocal & J. Adam Carter (eds.), The Epistemology of Group Disagreement. London: Routledge. pp. 9-45.

View all 17 citations / Add more citations

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