Collective epistemic goals

Social Epistemology 21 (3):267 – 280 (2007)
Abstract
We all pursue epistemic goals as individuals. But we also pursue collective epistemic goals. In the case of many groups to which we belong, we want each member of the group - and sometimes even the group itself - to have as many true beliefs as possible and as few false beliefs as possible. In this paper, I respond to the main objections to the very idea of such collective epistemic goals. Furthermore, I describe the various ways that our collective epistemic goals can come into conflict with each other. And I argue that we must appeal to pragmatic considerations in order to resolve such conflicts.
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DOI 10.1080/02691720701674106
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References found in this work BETA
Objective Knowledge.Karl R. Popper - 1972 - Oxford, Clarendon Press.
Theory of Knowledge.Roderick M. Chisholm - 1966 - Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall.
The Nature of Rationality.Robert Nozick - 1993 - Princeton University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
Group Justification in Science.Kristina Rolin - 2010 - Episteme 7 (3):215-231.
A New Group Dutch Book Argument.Matthew Kopec - 2017 - Ratio 30 (2):122-136.
Which Groups Have Scientific Knowledge? Wray Vs. Rolin.Chris Dragos - 2016 - Social Epistemology 30 (5-6):611-623.

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